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[Crim. No. 5779. In Bank. Feb. 24, 1956.J 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ANTHONY OITRINO, 
Appellant. 
[1J Criminal Law - Appeal- Objections - Evidence. - Where a 
criminal case was tried before the Supreme Court's decision 
in People v. Oahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, defendant 
is not precluded from raising on appeal the question that 
illegally obtained evidence was admitted against him though 
he did not object to the admissibility of the evidence at the 
trial. 
[2] Searches and Seizures-Presumptions.-Where the record is 
silent as to whether officers searching premises and defend-
ant's automobile had a search warrant and there is no evi-
dence showing illegality of the search, it must be presumed 
that the officers regularly and lawfully performed their duties. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subds. 1, 15, 33.) 
[3] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-Where 
officers could have testified to the presence of a conditional 
sales contract without removing it from the house that was 
searched and thus could have shown defendant's ownership 
of the automobile in question, he was not prejudiced by 
admission of the contract in evidence. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1) Criminal Law, § 1079; [2] Searches 
and Seizures, § 1; [3] Criminal Law, § 1382; [4] Criminal Law, 
§ 393(2); (5) Burglary, §§ 25, 26; [6-8] Burglary, § 40; [9] Wit-
nesses, § 135(4); [10] Criminal Law, § 1377(1); [11] Criminal 
Law, § 589; [12] Criminal Law, § 1407(9), 
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[4] Id.-Evidence-Other Orimes.-Except when it shows merely 
criminal disposition, evidence which tends logically and by 
reasonable inference to establish any fact material" for the 
prosec~tion, or to overcome any material fact to be proved 
by the defense, is admissible though it may connect the accused 
with an offense not included in the charge. 
[6] Burglary-Evidence.-Defendant's possession of atolen tools 
is a material fact in a burglary prosecution, and evidence that 
some of the tools were found early in the morning in a store 
under circumstances indicating that they had been recently 
abandoned, coupled with the fact that defendant's recently 
driven automobile was parked nearby, is circumstantial evi-
dence that defendant had been in possession of the tools. 
[6] Id.-Evidence-Possession of Stolen Goods.-Possession alone 
of property stolen in a burgla.ry is not of itself sufficient to 
sustain the possessor's conviction of that burglary j there must 
be corroborating evidence of acts, conduct or declarations of 
the accused tending to show his guilt. 
[7] Id.-Evidence-Possession of Btolen Goods.-When possession 
of property stolen in a burglary is shown, the corroborating 
evidence may be slight, and failure to show that possession 
was honestly obtained is itself a strong circumstance tending 
to show the possessor's guilt. 
[8] Id.-Evidence-Possession of Btolen Goods.-Proof of defend-
ant's possession of stolen goods accompanied by proof that 
he used fictitious names, falsely told a buyer that he received 
the property from his father, and disposed of some of the 
property at inadequate prices is sufficient to sustain a convic-
tion of burglary. 
[9] Witnesses-Oross-examination-Scope.-Where defendant on 
direct examination denies any participation in the burglaries 
charged, the prosecution can show circumstances that tend to 
connect him with the burglaries, and it is proper to ask him 
on cross-examination how his automobile got to a certain place 
and whether he had been in the vicinity at the time it was 
found. 
[10] .Oriminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Witnessu-Oross-
examination.-Questions relating to defendant's use of false 
addresses in purchasing an automobile were improper on his 
eross-examination in a burglary prosecution, but did not result 
in prejudice where his use of a false name at the same time 
had already properly been shown. 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 137 et seq. j Am.Jur., Evidence, 
§ 310 et seq. 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Burglary, § 38 j Am.Jur., Burglary, § 74. 
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[11] Id.-Conduct of OOUDseI.-Where defendant had testified that 
he left a certain place because the police were looking for him, 
it was not improper for the district attorney to make the obser-
vation that defendant was "carefully avoiding that address," 
tbis being a reasonable inference from defendant's testimony. 
[12J Id.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Argument of 
l'rosecuting Attome7.-In a prosecution for burglary, the 
district attorney's statement in his argument to the jury, 
"Here you have a man at the age of 22 who has devoted the 
latter part of his years to a life of crime," though improper 
because not supported by evidence, did not constitute re-
versible error where the jury was immediately instructed to' 
disregard it and in the light of the whole record it did not 
affect the verdict. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Eustace Cullinan, Jr., 
Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for burglary. Judgment of conviction of sec-
ond degree burglary, affirmed. 
Anthony Citrino, in pro. per., and Robert E. Tarbox, under 
appointment by the District Court of Appeal prior to transfer 
of the appeal, for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond M. Mom-
hoisse, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of 
conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of 
two counts of second degree burglary. 
During the evening of June 3, 1954, or the early morning 
of June 4th, the premises of William and Frederick Motors 
in San Francisco were burglarized. An automobile, various 
items of garage equipment, a battery, and tools were taken. 
During the evening of June 5, -1954, or the early morning 
of June 6th, the premises of Pacific Nash Motor Sales were 
burglarized. An automobile and a safe containing the com-
pany's records and automobile ownership certificates were 
taken. A few days later defendant sold to Ralph Astengo, 
a service station operator, some of the tools and equipment 
belonging to William and Frederick Motors and their em-
ployees. The sale price of $25 was much below the market 
value of the items sold. Defendant told Astengo that the 
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tools and equipment were his and that " [he] got them from 
his father ..•. " Astengo requested and received a bill of 
sale from defendant, who signed it with the name "Anthony 
Colla. " He returned in about five minutes and changed the 
signature to "Anthony Cotelli." At the trial, however, de-
fendant testified that an acquaintance named Gino Cotelli 
gave him the tools and equipment and that he did not know 
where Cotelli was. When arrested he was asked if he had 
sold property under the alias of Cotelli and he refused to 
answer. He admitted that he had lived at 345 Second Avenue 
in San Francisco under the name of Anthony Colla. He 
testified that he shared this house with Bill Bragg and Gino 
Cotelli, and that the three of them moved out of the house 
on June 17th because an informant told him that Inspector 
Keating of the San Francisco Police Department was looking 
for him and Bragg. Before defendant's arrest, Inspector 
Keating and other officers searched the premises and defend· 
ant's automobile, which was parked nearby. They found 
property taken in both burglaries in the garage and on the 
back porch and in the basement of the house. On a mantel-
piece, together with some of defendant's personal papers, 
they found a number of the stolen ownership certificates. On 
July 9th, tools stolen from William and Frederick Motors 
were found in a liquor store in Oakland, following a burglary 
thereof. An automobile purchased by defendant under the 
name of Robert Jennings was parked in a service station 
adjacent to the liquor store. The motor and hood were warm. 
Defendant testified that he gave the car to Bragg on about 
July 6th, that he did not commit the burglaries, that the 
property found by the officers at 345 Second Avenue was 
put there by Cotelli, and· that he did not know how the 
ownership certificates got onto the mantelpiece. 
[1] He contends that illegally obtained evidence was ad-
mitted against him. Since this case was tried before our 
decision in People v. Cahan, 44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905], 
he is not precluded from raising this question now although 
he did not object to the admissibility of the evidence at the 
trial. (People v. Kitchens, ante, p. 260 [294 P.2d 17].) 
[2] The record, however, is silent as to whether the officers 
had a search warrant, and in the absence of any evidence 
showing the illegality of the search, we must presume that 
the officers regularly and lawfully performed their duties. 
(People v. Farrara, ante, p. 265 [294 P.2d 21]; Code Civ. 
Proe., § 1963(1), (15), (33); People v. Serrano, 123 Cal.App. 
) 
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889, 841 [11 P.2d 81] ; Bee also 'Vaughn v. /0'fWJ8, 81 Ca1.2d 
586, 601 [191 P.2d 432].) Defendant argues that even if 
the officers had a search warrant they exceeded any authority 
it might give them (Bee Pen. Code, § 1524) when they took 
a conditional sales contract showing his purchase of the auto-
mobile found near the liquor store in Oakland. [3] Since 
the officers could have testified to the presence of the contract 
without removing it from the house and thus have shown 
his ownership of the automobile, he was not prejudiced by 
the admission into evidence of the contract itself. (0/. People 
v. BoyZes, 45 Ca1.2d 652, 654 [290 P.2d 535].) 
Defendant contends that the evidence of the commission of 
another crime, the burglary of the Oakland liquor store, was 
erroneously admitted. [4] It is now "settled in this state 
that except when it shows merely criminal disposition, evidence 
which tends logically and by reasonable inference to establish 
any fact material for the prosecution, or to overcome any 
material fact sought to be proved by the defense, is admissible 
although it may connect the accused with an oJfense not in-
cluded in the charge." (People v. Woods, 35 Ca1.2d 504, 509 
[218 P.2d 981].) [5] Defendant's possession of the stolen 
tools was a material fact, and the evidence that some of the 
tools were found early in the morning in a store under 
circumstances indicating that they had been recently aban-
doned coupled with the fact that defendant's recently driven 
automobile was parked nearby was circumstantial evidence 
that defendant had been in possession of the tools. 
Defendant's main contention is that the evidence is in-
sufficient to support the verdict. He argues that there is 
nothing in the record to connect him with the burglaries 
other than the evidence of his sale of some of the stolen prop-
erty to Astengo. [6] Possession alone of property stolen 
in a burglary is not of itself sufficient to sustain the posses-
sor's conviction of that burglary. There must be corroborating 
evidence of acts, conduct, or declarations of the accused 
tending to show his guilt. (People v. Boxer, 137 Cal. 562, 
563-564 [70 P. 671] ; People v. Carroll, 79 Cal.App.2d 146, 
148 [179 P.2d 75].) [7] When possession is shown, how-
ever, the corroborating evidence may be slight (People v. 
Morris, 124 Cal.App. 402, 404 [12 P.2d 679] ; People v. Taylor, 
4 Cal.App.2d 214, 217 [40 P.2d 870] ; People v. BusseU, 34 
Cal.App.2d 665, 669 [94 P.2d 400]; People v. Thompson, 
120 Cal.App.2d 359, 363 [260 P.2d 1019]), and the failure 
to show that possession was honestly obtained is itself a 
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strong circumstance tending to show the possessor's guilt of 
the burglary. (People v. Lang, 142 Cal. 482, 484-485 [76 
P. 232]; People v. Taylor, supra, 4 Ca1.App.2d 214, 217.) 
[8] Defendant's explanation that Cotelli gave him the prop-
frty was not contradicted by any witness, but in view of 
defendant's own use of that name and the fact that he did 
not know where Cotelli was at the time of the trial, the jury 
could reasonably conclude that Cotelli and his gift were both 
fictitious. (People v. Buratti, 96 Cal.App.2d 417, 418-419 
[215 P.2d 500].) Other corroborative evidence was his false 
statement to Astengo that he received the property from 
his father (see People v. Conrad, 125 Ca1.App.2d 184, 185 
r270 P.2d 31] ; People v. Goodall, 104 Cal.App.2d 242, 247 
[231 P.2d 119] ; People v. Mercer, 103 Cal.App.2d 782, 789 
[230 P.2d 4] ; People v. Buratti, supra, 96 Cal.App.2d 417, 
419; People v. Russell, supra, 34 Cal.App.2d 665, 669), his 
selling tools and equipment worth more than $150 for $25 
(see People v. Buratti, s'upra, at 419), his using the aliases 
"Anthony Colla" and" Anthony Cotelli" in making the sale 
(see People v. Bl,ratti, supra, at 419; People v. Morris, supra, 
124 Ca1.App. 402, 404), and his testimony that he and the 
others moved out of the house on Second Avenue because an 
informant told him that Inspector Keating was looking for 
him and that he bought the automobile found in Oakland 
under the name of Robert Jennings because the inspector 
was looking for him under the name of Anthony Colla. 
[9] Defendant also contends that the trial court errone-
ously permitted thp. district attorney to question him beyond 
the proper limits of cross-examination. (Pen. Code, § 1323.) 
On direct examination defendant denied any participation 
in the two burglaries charged. On cross-examination he was 
asked how his automobile got to Oakland and whether he had 
been in the vicinity at the time it was found. The questions 
were proper, for when a defendant takes the stand and makes 
a general denial of the crime with which he is charged, the 
prosecution ean show circumstances that tend to connect him 
with it. (People v. Zerillo, 36 Cal.2d 222, 227-229 [223 P.2d 
223].) [10] Questions relating to defendant's use of false 
addresses in purchasing the automobile were improper, but 
he could not have been prejudiced by them, since his use of a 
false name at the same time had already properly been shown. 
[11] Defendant contends that the district attorney was 
guilty of prejudicial misconduct in making an offer of proof 
til C.JcI-l. 
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and in his argument to the jury. In attempting to determine 
defendant's reason for ftight when he heard that Inspector 
Keating was looking for him, the district attorney asked de-
fendant why he abandoned an automobile at the Second Ave-
nue residence. Upon defendant's objection and the court's 
observation that the examination was somewhat afield, the 
district attorney stated, "Well, your Honor, the car was 
seen at Second Avenue. The man was carefully avoiding that 
address after the burglary." The observation that defendant 
was "carefully avoiding that address" was a reasonable in-
ference from defendant's own testimony that he left because 
the police were looking for him, and even if the statement 
that "the ear was seen at Second Avenue" was "somewhat 
afield," it would not justify a reversal. [12] The district at-
torney's statement in his argument to the jury, "Here yon 
have a man at the age of 22 who has devoted the latter part of 
his years to a life of crime" was not supported by the evidence 
and was therefore improper. The jury, however, was im-
mediately instructed to disregard it, and in the light of the 
whole record we do not believe that it affected their verdict. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., 
concurred. Shenk, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance but 
I do not agree with what is said in the majority opinion with 
respect to the rule announced in People v. Woods, 35 Cal.2d 
504 [218 P.2d 981J,in which case I dissented. I do not 
believe that the facts in the Woods ease are analogous to 
the facts in the case at bar or that it is necessary to rely 
on the Woods case as authority for the conclusion· reached 
in the ease at bar. 
) 
